The glossary provides definitions of terms and concepts included in the CONSOLE Project and, in particular, for the conceptual framework. Given below is the non- academic version of the glossary and is meant to communicate the core concepts and definitions of the project in more straightforward language among practitioners. The academic version of the glossary is available with the complete version of the draft framework (Deliverable D1.4), which is available on the CONSOLE website and is open access.
The parties involved in a contract can be classified according to the institution involved. For instance, a typical form of the agri- environmental scheme involves a public institution (payer) and an individual (the farmer receiving the payment). Other forms of contracts where only private parties are involved are attracting a relevant interest, as in the case of many value-chain contracts. Intermediaries can also be part of a contract that can facilitate the development of more articulated forms of contracts.
A contract is a formal agreement signed between two or more parties. Contracts are defined/qualified by a set of different features arranged in different combinations that outline several alternatives. The length of a contract is an important feature for the achievement of environmental goals. Indeed, longer contracts are usually required to reach a range of environmental and climate targets.
An economical process generating a secondary (and usually unintended) impact affecting a third party is an externality. Externalities can be positive (benefits) or negative (costs). The concept of environmental externality is particularly important for the design of agri-environmental schemes as these are usually focused on reducing negative environmental externalities typically related to agricultural activities such as water pollution, biodiversity depletion, etc.
In general, flexibility concerns the possibility to customize to local/individual cases a contract; for instance, the possibility for a farmer to adapt a contract to his farm. Flexibility increases the acceptability of contracts but adds bargaining processes and potential trade-offs. Flexibility is also a core aspect of result- based contracts. Indeed, the philosophy of such contracts is based on leaving the farmers complete freedom of choice to reach the result of interest.
Monitoring and enforcement activities are necessary to ensure that farmers carry out the conservation measures for which they receive payments. Monitoring refers to checking the compliance with the clauses in a contract. Monitoring can also refer to programs aimed at studying/assessing the environmental impact of a specific agri-environmental scheme. Enforcement refers to procedures and sanctions that are applied in case of non-compliance.
In economics, a public good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non- rivalrous means that a good can be “used” by multiple individuals. Non-excludable means that it is not possible to exclude someone from “using” that good. An example is a natural landscape: it can be enjoyed by multiple individuals that cannot be excluded from enjoying it. Nonetheless, pure environmental public goods responding exactly to those conditions are not common. For instance, a seascape is a public good where the non-rivalrous condition might be affected by overcrowding. Access to a natural park can be regulated so that it is not non-excludable. Thus, different possible cases do exist that are classified as club goods (non-rivalrous but excludable) and common goods (non-excludable but rivalrous).
A variable (e.g., number of birds, hectares under a prescribed practice, etc.) on which the payment of an agri-environmental scheme is linked. Result-based schemes are characterized by a payment calibrated to a result parameter like higher species density, higher soil organic matter, etc. The parameter for the calculation of the payment can also originate from models or calculated in a point-system: In that case, the farmer can select across a range of practices, and on that base, the farmer’s environmental performance is assessed.
Two or more farmers/actors working together towards the achievement of a common goal identifies cooperation or collaboration. Cooperation is usually structured as a single entity represented by an intermediary that acts as the liaison with the paying agency to manage controversies and the distribution of the payment to the community. Collaboration features a group of members that agree to a plan of activities related to specific practices to achieve an environmental goal. However, no formal hierarchical structure is present, and each member is individually responsible toward the paying agency. Such forms of collaboration can also be defined as “networks.”
Tenure-related contracts involve environmental clauses affecting the property and land-use rights on the land. For instance, grazing rights on communal lands are granted to farmers conditional to specific herd/flock management or landowners that rent at reduced fees to achieve an environmental target (e.g., Forest bank case study FI1).
the feature of this solution concerns the valorization of a specific food supply chain according to the public good(s) that is delivered by its components. Typically, information on public goods delivered by supplier farms is transferred all along with the value chain up to the final consumers of the food product by means, for instance, of a brand. The rationale of the contract is based on the competitive advantage attributed to the product and the firms (e.g., consumer trust) involved in the value chain